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NO. 29 JULY 2018 Introduction 
Yes, He Can: Trump Provokes a 
Trade War 
A Clever EU Will Refrain from Further Tariffs but Hold Firm on WTO Rules 
Bettina Rudloff 
The transatlantic trade dispute is escalating: After the United States (US) introduced 
additional tariffs on steel and aluminium, hectic negotiations began with the Euro-
pean Union (EU). First, the EU obtained a temporary derogation before increasing 
tariffs on a long list of particularly symbolic and politically sensitive products, such 
as orange juice and Harley-Davidson motorcycles. At the same time, the EU, in con-
cert with other states, made the first move in a possible World Trade Organization 
(WTO) dispute procedure against the US. The US, in the meantime, has signalled the 
next round by deciding to examine options for tariffs on cars. Existing multinational 
rules leave only a limited scope for tariff increases, all of which bear the risk of 
further escalation. It would therefore be wise for the EU not to exhaust this leeway 
but to keep cool and stay liberal in its approach to trade. 
 
Following the experiences during the world 
economic crisis of the 1930s – experiences 
that were also fuelled by spiralling tariffs – 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
(GATT), a forerunner of today’s WTO, came 
into force in 1948. The participating states 
agreed on reliable rules for undistorted 
trade, for example by reducing national 
tariffs. Moreover, tariffs may only be raised 
unilaterally up to an agreed tariff ceiling 
(“bound tariff”) without any further re-
quirements. Increases beyond these ceilings 
follow different rules, depending on the 
underlying justification. 
Limited WTO scope for unilateral 
increases in tariffs 
Rules for increases in tariffs beyond the 
bound tariffs and other trade restrictions 
(Table 1, p. 2) can initially be differentiated 
according to the justification, that is, whether 
measures such as the recent American 
tariffs on steel and aluminium are aimed at 
protecting against unfair trade practices of 
other countries or envisage other objectives. 
There are also different procedural guidelines, 
such as deadlines. Reactive tariffs – used to 
compensate for disadvantages resulting 
from justified trade restrictions – are rarely 
possible. However, the complaint option is 
always open. 
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Table 1 
WTO scope for unilateral trade restrictions and reaction 
Basis 
GATT article 
Measure Justification, process Reaction by 
affected state 
General objectives    
 Balance of payments 
(Art. XII GATT) 
Limitation to quantity or value 
of imports 
Consultation after 1 year – 
 Exceptions from 
elimination of quantitative 
restrictions  
(Art. XI GATT) 
Export- and import restrictions Special market situations for 
agricultural and essential products 
– 
 General exceptions 
(Art. XX GATT) 
“Necessary” measure List of objectives (e.g. human, 
animal and plant health), 
justification by necessity 
– 
 Safeguards 
(Art. XIX GATT) 
Feasible measures, no voluntary 
export restraints, automatic 
tariffs for agriculture 
Serious injury, provisional 
protection possible, time limit 
Reactive tariffs, 
3-year blocking 
period in spe-
cial conditions  
 Waiver Individual exceptions Majority rules for approvals by 
WTO states  
– 
 National security  
(Art. XXI GATT) 
Information limitation, 
any measure 
Military products, unspecified crisis – 
Safeguards against states’ behaviour   
 Countervailing dumping 
and subsidies (“trade 
defence instruments”) 
(Art. VI GATT) 
Tariff Proof of damage and correlation, 
provisional protection possible, 
time limit 
– 
 Retaliation/penalty 
(Dispute Settlement Under-
standing) 
Tariff Enforcing a decision on a dispute – 
 
Dangerous rhetoric of retaliation 
and penalties 
The current transatlantic conflict is essen-
tially about the question of whether the 
recent US tariffs on steel and aluminium 
are to be understood as market-based pro-
tective tariffs under Article XIX GATT or 
as tariffs with national security objectives 
under Article XXI GATT. In any case, neither 
the American nor the European reactive 
tariffs are “retaliatory” or “penalty tariffs”. 
These terms are reserved solely for the WTO 
dispute system – as a final means of im-
plementing a dispute’s decision. The misuse 
of the terminology in the public debate 
suggests self-justice among states. This false 
impression weakens confidence in the 
already weakened WTO. 
Imminent risk in WTO rules of 
mixing tariffs and security policy 
The national security argument has rarely 
been used in the past to justify trade re-
strictions: The EU established tariffs against 
the former Yugoslavia in the early 1990s. In 
the 1980s, the US utilised this argument to 
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justify a trade embargo against Nicaragua. 
A GATT panel decision at that time did not 
legally come into effect but stated that, as 
a commercial body, it could not rule on 
security issues. In 1996, the Helms-Burton 
Act under then-President Bill Clinton used 
the security argument against Cuba, even 
in relation to third countries trading with 
Cuba. A relaxation of the measures was 
achieved in the course of a WTO dispute 
procedure initiated by the EU. A new panel 
decision on the national security clause is 
expected at the end of 2018 in the case of 
Russia against Ukraine, which justifies 
import bans under Article XXI GATT. The 
ruling could bring legal clarity on the inter-
pretation of the national security trade 
argument for the first time. 
EU choosing between plague 
and cholera 
All EU response options presented below 
are risky: not only for the EU, but also for 
global trade and other trading partners, 
and not least for confidence in the WTO. 
(1) The EU could start a WTO dispute. After 
the US tariff exemption for European steel 
and aluminium products ended, the EU 
began formal WTO consultations with the 
US on 1 June. Canada, Mexico, and Norway 
followed soon afterwards. China and India 
had already begun consultations with the 
US. If these consultations fail, these states 
may initiate a formal dispute. All complain-
ing states doubt the rightful justification 
by Article XIX GATT. Thus, they assume 
that the US is using market protection as a 
reason and not national security – this is 
the only way to justify tariff lists being 
drawn up as well by the EU as counter-
measure (Table 1). 
Risk: The arbitration body of the WTO 
will no longer be able to act from autumn 
2019 onwards because the US is blocking 
the replacement of the appellate judges. 
This means that no further decisions are 
possible after a panel decision. How this 
could turn out is still unclear. So far, the US 
has based its tariffs on the domestic section 
232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, 
which aims to protect the US from threats 
to its national security. It could therefore 
be in line with Article XXI GATT. If a panel 
accepts the security argument, the EU tariff 
list would not be WTO-conforming any 
longer. It is not clear whether the pending 
ruling in the case of Russia against Ukraine 
will support America’s use of security 
reasons as justification. 
(2) The established EU tariff list covers 
similar products when compared to meas-
ures against US steel tariffs in 2003. At 
that time, however, the administration of 
George W. Bush referred to an import glut, 
and thus clearly used Article XIX GATT to 
justify the American tariffs. A WTO deci-
sion allowed the EU to impose retaliatory 
tariffs. They were not used in the end, as 
the US abolished its steel tariffs. The cur-
rent EU tariff list includes nearly 400 – 
mainly symbolic – products from states 
governed by the Republican Party with an 
initial total value of €2.8 billion per year. 
A second stage for additional reactive duties 
is envisaged for three years from now, in 
accordance with Article XIX GATT (Table 1). 
Risk: The US could beat the EU with its 
own weapons. If the US disagrees that the 
EU is taking countermeasures and sees 
these as safeguards only to protect its own 
market, the US can, in turn, react with 
countermeasures. The tariff spiral would 
therefore turn even faster. Actually, the US 
very recently has chosen to challenge the 
justification of the established reactive 
tariff lists of the EU, China, Canada, Mexico, 
and Turkey in mid July by complaining to 
the WTO. Generally, reactive tariffs are also 
detrimental to the implementing importer, 
such as the EU: Whether there will be 
subsequent price increases for consumers 
depends on supply alternatives, which 
are hardly available for genuine American 
products such as Harley-Davidsons. 
(3) Any affected country may impose 
its own safeguards on aluminium and steel 
under Article XIX GATT to compensate for 
the damage caused by initiated safeguards. 
The US tariffs can divert products that were 
previously imported to the US into the EU 
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instead. Actually, the EU just decided at the 
end of July to define additional tariffs of 25 
per cent on steel imports, with some excep-
tions. They are following the rules for pro-
visional protection according to GATT XIX 
for a maximum of 200 days, depending on 
the actual increase in imports (Table 1). 
Risk: The US could challenge the import 
injury. Moreover, the EU may lose strategi-
cally important coalition partners in the 
conflict with the US, such as China, Brazil, 
or Russia, due to the disadvantages it brings 
to them with these tariffs being applicable 
to all steel-trading partners. These countries 
may react by their own tariff lists – so this 
option could also further drive the escala-
tion of tariffs. 
(4) Compromises already emerged in the 
public debate during the phase of the ex-
ception being applied to European sup-
pliers: Options discussed were voluntary 
export restraints, which are, however, 
excluded by Article XIX GATT. A “TTIP 
light”, that is, the reduction of EU tariffs 
for individual products such as cars, is also 
being considered. 
Risk: Any exemption for individual part-
ners can be undermined and challenged 
under the WTO’s basic idea of general trade 
justice under the “most favoured nation” 
approach. Exceptions can also offer black-
mail potential for new concessions. A com-
plete zero-tariff policy for all products and 
all countries would be possible and could 
bring the offensively trade-pacifist EU off of 
every trade-related firing line. However, it 
has the disadvantage of limiting the scope 
for future liberalisation negotiations. In 
addition, interests also differ within the EU: 
Although an offer for the industrial sector 
within the framework of a “TTIP light” is 
conceivable for Germany, this does not 
seem to be an option for France. 
5) The EU could also use non-tariff meas-
ures, such as tightened labelling require-
ments, to make it more difficult to import 
American products. 
Risk: Although these measures are, in 
principle, more flexible than tariffs, they 
cannot be presented as a direct political 
reaction to US behaviour. In addition, 
they too can be challenged or can lead to 
a “standard escalation” comparable to that 
of tariffs. 
The smart move for the EU: 
No tit for tat 
Past conflicts have often reached the limits 
of formal rules when there were extreme 
differences in interests: For example, in 
the hormone case between the EU and the 
US/Canada, the ruling allowed for retaliatory 
tariffs to be imposed on EU products. How-
ever, this last means of the WTO dispute 
failed: For 10 years, the EU was subject to 
retaliation in the form of about $130 mil-
lion per year in trade volume because, 
despite the WTO ruling, it maintained the 
ban on importing beef produced using 
hormones. Ongoing negotiations finally 
brought a solution: The EU even main-
tained the ban on beef containing hor-
mones, but it offered tariff incentives for 
hormone-free meat. 
With patience, solutions can sometimes 
be found. Also today, the EU should mini-
mise their exposure as much as possible 
and play for time while continually making 
offers for dialogue with Trump. Domestic 
reactions to US policy, such as Harley-
Davidson’s relocation plan, can play into 
the EU’s hands, as can new EU trade agree-
ments, like the one with Japan, which 
isolates the US as trade partner. In playing 
for time, the EU should refrain from further 
countermeasures, even if the US imposes 
tariffs on foreign cars. This is the only way 
to end the already started escalation, which 
also depends on the EU’s behaviour. Better 
to withstand short-term losses than a loss 
of confidence in the WTO’s rules. This could 
end in trade anarchy, which the world has 
already experienced and led to the creation 
of GATT. 
Dr. Bettina Rudloff is a Senior Associate in the EU / Europe Division at SWP. 
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